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NOTES.
CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-VALIDITY OF A SYSTEM OF
CONTRACTS SEEKING TO CONTROL THE PRICE AT WHICH AN ARTICLE

SHALL BE REsOLD.-Contracts seeking to Control the price at which
an article shall be resold are of two types. In contracts of the first
type, the manufacturer undertakes to maintain a uniform price by
putting into effect what may be characterized as the "rebate plan"
whereby the manufacturer promises to refund to dealers maintaining the selling prices fixed by the producer, a portion of the
purchase price paid by them. This, while operating as an inducement to the dealer to resell only at the price named, in no way
binds him to do so. And this type of contracts has been uniformly
Of the second type are the various kinds of contracts
upheld.'
employed in what may be described as the "contract system." The
simplest form of this type is where the maker affixes to every package of his article a notice that the goods may be resold only at
certain prices. In another simple form it consists of contracts between

'Inre Greene, 52 Fed. 1O4 (1894); Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 6o2
(I885); Walsh v. Dwight, 58 N. Y. Supp. 91 (1899).
(20)

NOTES
the manufacturer and wholesaler, whereby the latter agrees to supply
the trade at a stated price, and to sell only to dealers who will
maintain the fixed retail price. In another variant form, which,
however, has been held only colorable 2 the contract with the wholesaler purports to make him a distributing agent for the producer.
In the final phase of the evolution of this system the contract with
the wholesaler requires him to sell only to dealers approved by the
manufacturer, with whom the manufacturer contracts directly, that,
in consideration of their being supplied with his product, they will
not sell below the fixed retail price. This was the system adopted
by the producer of a so-called "patent" medicine, in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.; 3 and the Supreme Court held the
contract void as being an illegal restraint of trade, both at common
law and under the Sherman Act.
The true test by which the legality of a contract requiring the
purchaser to resell at a fixed price is to be determined is (i) whether
the stipulation is of an ancillary nature; (2) whether it affords only
a reasonable protection to the business of the covenantee; and (3)
whether such a stipulation, considered with reference to the benefit
to the public arising from the production of the article, as well as
the detriment to the public in being deprived of the benefit of free
competition, as to the selling price, is, upon the whole, against public
interest. 4 It is not the fact of restraint, but the degree of the restriction which will control; and in the last analysis the question
as to the validity of a particular contract will be found largely one
of expediency. 5 This comomn law principle is not peculiar to
"trade-secret" articles, but is equally applicable to any chattel property. But it must be remembered that the court was not dealing
with a single contract, in the principal case, but with a system of
contracts covering the entire production of the complainant, and the
reason which might uphold covenants restraining the liberty of a
single buyer might prove quite inadequate where there are a multitude of similar agreements. The single covenant might in no way
8
affect the public interest, when many such agreements might.
be the
may
It is well settled that articles covered by patents
subject of contracts by which their price in subsale is controlled
by the patentee; and that such contracts, if otherwise valid, are not
within the rules of the common law against monopolies and re'See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 Fed. 8o3
(C. C. A., i9o8).
"220 U S. 373 (19I).
'Edgar Lumber Co. v. Cormie, I3O S. W. 452 (Ark., i9Io); Hubbard v.
Miller, 27 Mich. I5 (1873); Roberts v. Lamont, io2 N. W. 770 (Neb., i9o5);
Merriman v. Cover, 51 S. E. 817 (Va., 1905).
, Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt & Co., i9o4 A. C. 565; Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396 (I889).
'Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C. C. A., 19o7).
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straint of trade.7 Until very recently the doctrine prevailed that the
manufacturer of "trade-secret" articles had similar rights.8 This
,mistaken conception resulted from an apparent similarity between
the conditions surrounding articles manufactured under "tradesecrets" and those manufactured under patents; and from a failure
to distinguish between the sale of a secret formula and the sale of
the articles manufactured therefrom. Since the decision in the
principal case it can no longer be doubted that the exemption extended to patented articles does not apply to "trade-secret" productsI
The trading-stamp 10 and railroad ticket " cases have frequently
been cited in support of a system of contracts like that in the principal
case. But these cases rest upon the peculiar character of the property rights involved. Neither concerns the buying and selling of
articles of general commerce; and both relate to things in the nature
of contracts personal in character, and not to things which can ever
become the subject of general trade and traffic. Like all contracts
personal in their nature, they can be transferred and assigned only
'Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902).

It has been sug-

gested that the relation of the patent cases to the general subject may be
more clearly understood by saying that the circumstance that the promisee has
been granted a legal monopoly does not, in fact, create an exemption from
the general operation of the rule, but rather brings them within the exception
existing in the case of ancillary stipulation reasonably necessary to the protection of a party to a legitimate business transaction.
"Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88 (1889) ; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Platt, 142

Fed. 6o6 (19o6) ; Miles v. Jayne, 149 Fed. 838 (19o6) ; Garst v. Harris, 177
Mass. 72 (19oo); Park v. National Wholesale Druggists' Assn., 175 N. Y. I
(903).
'In Hartman v. Park, 145 Fed. 358 (i9o6), Judge Cochran, although he
sustained a system of contracts similar to the one in the principal case, concluded that secret process articles were no more exempt from the common
law rule against restraints of trade than any other article of ma"ufacture.
This case was reversed on appeal, Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (C. C. A.,
19o7), but in his opinion in this case and in Dr. Miles Co. v. Park, 64 Fed.
803 (C. C. A., 19o8), Mr. Justice Lurton (then Circuit Judge) states the
law in these strong terms: "Any other conclusion would be to sanction a
monopoly in that class of goods vastly more far reaching than the monopoly
extended upon high grounds of public policy to the inventor. The statutory
monopoly has a limitation of a few years. To obtain it the inventor must
put on record his invention. At the end of the term the public will be free to
employ the discovery without the burden theretofore imposed as a compensation to the inventor. Not so with the monopoly asked for by those who
control the enormous proprietary trade of this country. Their monopoly will
go on forever, and, if there be merit in the formula, they may not only
preserve it thru all time, but continue to restrain prices and prevent competition in the sale of the product." See also Grogan v. Chaffee, i56 Cal.
611 (igog), and W. H. Hill & Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163 Mich. 12 (19io).
"'Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 Fed. 833
(I904).

' Nashville Ry. Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65 (897).

NOTES
with the assent of both contracting parties and12 only upon the conditions to which the contracting parties assent.
Many of the decisions contra to the principal case have treated
cases holding that authors have a common law right in their compositions before publication, and cases recognizing a similar property in news or information, as authorities for the proposition that
a manufacturer may control the resale price of his product. It is
submitted that the principles underlying the cases are not analogous.
It is the policy of the law to reward individual thought and research
by protecting the enjoyment of their fruits: thus the author, 13 the
news gatherer,' 4 and the owner of an unpatented invention 15 are
protected against the piratical use of their peculiar property. A
similar protection is extended to the chemist who has discovered
a secret formula.' 6 But it does not follow that because a secret
process or formula will be protected against betrayal by those to
whom it has been communicated in confidence under a contract for
a restricted use, that a system of contracts for the control of all
sales and subsales of the article when produced will be outside of
the rules in restraint of trade, simply because it is the product of
such secret formula.
So the cases analogous to the invention, composition and news
cases are those in which a secret process or formula is protected; not
cases in which the owner of the secret is attempting to control all
resales of the finished article. The principal case recognizes this
distinction. Though irreconcilable with some of the earlier cases,' 7
it is in accord with the more recent decisions ;" and certainly appears
to be sound.
C.L.M.
'Bitterman v. Railroad Co., 207 U. S. 205 (19o7); Park v. Hartman,
,vupra; Hill v. Gray & Worcester, supra.
"Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burrows K B. Rep. (1774) ; Palmer v. Dewet,
47 N. Y. 532 (1872).
"Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory (1896) I Q. B. 147; Board of Trade v.
Christie, 198 U. S. 236 (1905) ; Dodge v. Information Co, 183 Mass. 62 (19o3).
"Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) ; Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N. E.
12

(N. Y., i889).

"Harrison v. Glucose Co., 116 Fed. 304 (C. C. A., i92); Thum v.
Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149 (1897); Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400 (885);
Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480 (i8gi) ; see also Maxim Nordenfelt v. Nordenfelt (1893) I Ch. D. 630, for a review of the English cases.
"Ellimon Co. v. Carrington (19O1) 2 Ch. D. 275; Grogan v. Chaffee,
supra; Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144 (1905) ; Ice Co. v. Park, 21 How. Pr.
See also cases cited under note (8), supra.
302 (N. Y., 1861).
For the real basis for the decision in Park v. Nat. Wholesale Druggists'
Assn., supra, see Straus v. American Publishers' Assn., 177 N. Y. 473 (I904),
opinion by Parker, C. J., who wrote a concurring opinion in the Park case.
" Park v. Hartman, supra; Dr. Miles Co. v. Park, supra; Hill v. Gray &
Worcester, supra.
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GIFrS-VALIDITY-EXTENT OF GIFT.-The extent of the power
of a parent to make gifts to a child was considered in the case of
Pearce v. Stines. 1 An old man of more than eighty years, about
seven weeks before his death, delivered a deed to the house and
lot in which he lived to a daughter. A son of the donor charged that
this gift was void as being obtained by undue influence at a time
when, by reason of his mental and physical infirmities, the donor
did not possess sufficient mind to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of his act. The evidence seemed to show
that at the time the gift was made the donor, though ill and - hysically very weak, thoroughly understood what he was doing. There
was no proof that any undue influence had, in fact, been exerted.
The house and lot included in the deed were valued at about three
thousand dollars, and the rest of the decedent's real estate, all unimproved, at about thirty-seven hundred dollars. He had practically
no personal property. As against this he owed debts of almost three
thousand dollars to the complainant. On these facts the complainant
argued that inasmuch as the property included in the deed was the
most valuable part of the donor's property, that on which he depended for shelter and support, the gift was void. The court so
held, and set aside the gift.
Where a confidential relation exists between the donor and
the donee, the donee being the dominant party in the relation, the
law scrutinizes with jealousy a gift from the former to the latter,
and such transaction is presumptively void, the burden being on
the donee to show its absolute fairness. 2 As between parent and
child, the former is presumed to be the dominant party. So a gift
from parent to child is not of itself sufficient to raise a presumption
of undue influence. 3 A parent who does occupy such dominant
4
position may give away as much of his property as he pleases.
When, however, the parent, through the infirmity of old age
or illness, ceases to be the dominant party, the child must remove any
doubt as to the existence of undue influence. 5 The extent of the
proof required of the donee depends upon the proportion which
the subject-matter of the gift bears to the donor's entire estate.
If the amount of the gift is not so great as to denude the donor of
his means of existence, the donee need show only that the gift was
born of the untrammeled will of the donor, and not of the domination of the donee.0 But when the gift has the effect of stripping
the donor of all or practically. all of his property, the donee is required to show more than an absence of influence on his own part.
'go Atl. 941 (N. J. 1911).
2Hasel v. Beilstein, i79 Pa. 56o (1897).
' Sanders v. Gurley, 44 So. 1022 (Ala. i97).

' James v. Aller, N. J. Eq. 666 (19o4).
'Le Gendre v. Goodridge, 46 N. J. Eq. 419 (i889).
*Haydock v. Haydock, 34 N. J. Eq. 57o (88), as interpreted by Post
v. Hagen, 71 N. J. Eq. 234 (9o6).
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He must prove, in addition, that the donor 7had competent and independent advice as to the effect of his act.
In Post v. Hagan,6 the court said: "Proper independent advice
in this connection means that the donor had the preliminary benefit
of conferring fully and privately upon the subject of his intended
gift with a person who was not only competent to inform him
correctly as to its legal effect, but who was furthermore so dissociated from the interests of the donee as to be in a position to
advise with the donor impartially and confidently as to the consequences to himself of his proposed benefaction."
Applying this rule to our principal case, the decision was
inevitable. For there was here no form or semblance of such advice,
and the subject-matter of the gift represented about all the property
that the donor owned over and above his debts.
The public policy upon which such a rule is founded is apparent. It is just and reasonable that it should not be possible for
those who, by old age or illness, may be deprived of their mental
vigor, to deprive themselves of their means of support, even in the
absence of irresistible importunities, unless advised so to do by
disinterested and competent parties. It is, therefore, not surprising
to find the authorities outside of New Jersey agreeing with such
a rule.' It is submitted that what few cases hold that the receipt of
such advice is not necessary, are really cases in which the donor
and donee did not stand in a confidental relation at all.
The interesting question which arises is as to how much a
donor may give, without bringing himself within this rule. The
court in our principal case wisely remarks that the question is not
so much one of definite fractions, as of practical results. Judge
Stephens goes on to say: "I think the practical rule . . . is, that
a donor, having barely sufficient property to sustain himself for the
rest of his life, shall not irrevocably and without advice, give away
so much of it as to leave himself an object of charity." This seems
eminently reasonable.
P.V.R.M.

NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF A RAILROAD COMPANY, AND OF THE
TO WHOM IT HAS DELIVERED A DEFECTIVE CAR, FOR

CONSIGNEE

INJURY TO THE CONSIGNEE'S SERVANT.-In the recent Massachusetts

1
case of D'Almeida v. Boston & M. R. R., a railroad delivered a
number of cars loaded with coal to a milling company upon a sidetrack. In pursuance of an arrangement with the railroad, certain
' Coffey v. Sullivan, 49 Atl. 42o (N. J. igoi). Slack v. Rees, 66 N. J.
Eq. 447 (i9o3), as interpreted by Post v. Hagen, supra.
aCaspari v. The First German Church of the New Jerusalem, 82 Mo.
649 (,884); Gibson v. Hammaug, 63 Neb. 349 (9OI).
'Soberaues v. Soberaues, 97 Cal. i4o (1893); Couchman's Adm. v.
Couchman, 98 Ky. In9 (1895).
a95 N. E. Rep. 398 (Mass. 1911).
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employees of the milling company went upon the side-track and
moved the cars over a spur of track leading to the mill, where the
coal was to be unloaded. While the cars were thus in transit one
of the cars upset because it was out of repair, and an employee of
the milling company was killed. Both the railroad and the milling
company were held liable to the administrator of the deceased.
The basis of the liability of the milling company was held to
be the duty which an employer owes his servants to provide safe
instrumentalities with which to work. Having adopted these cars as
part of its works for the time being, the milling company was liable2
for injuries caused by defects discoverable by reasonable diligence.
In thus deciding, the court is clearly right in principle, but in
precedent the authorities are divided. Cases in the courts of Massachusetts,3 Illinois, 4 and Virginia 5 support the principal case. On
the other hand the courts of Pennsylvania 6 and Indiana 7 impose
no duty upon the consignor or consignee of a car delivered into his
possession. The opinions in these latter cases are brief and it is
submitted that they are hard to justify. Had the master bought or
hired the cars which he had temporarily taken over from the railroad and made part of his own plant, he would most certainly be
liable to his servants for obvious defects. Manifestly no distinction
can be based upon the mere circumstance of his limited right of
property in the cars. So far as his duty to his employees is concemed, he should be regarded as the owner pro Vempore.
The railroad was held liable because it had selected and forwarded the cars, the defects in which had caused the death of the
plaintiff's intestate. It was held to owe a duty to the intestate to
use ordinary care in the selection of the car. No fundamental reason
is assigned for the existence of this obligation. It is submitted that
the true basis of the duty is to be found in the benefit accruing to
the railroad from its traffic arrangement with the intestate's employer." It is not meant that the right of action is based solely upon
the agreement; for obviously the intestate was not a party to the contract, and cannot derive benefit therefrom. 8 Since the railroad receives a benefit, perhaps directly in the shape of mileage or demurrage charges, and certainly indirectly in the shape of increased
business because of the convenience to the shipper in being permitted to unload directly upon his own premises, the railroad, in

'Labatt on Master and Servant, Vol.

I, p. 372.
'Spaulding v. Flynt Granite Co., 259 Mass. 587 (1893); followed in
Foster v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R., 187 Mass. 21 (1904).
'Sack v. Dolese, 137 Ill. i29 (i89i); New Ohio Co. v. Hendman, mxg
Ill. App. 287 (go5).
'Risque v. C. & 0. R. R., lo4 Va. 476 (19o5).
'Anderson v. Oliver, 138 Pa. 156 (89o); McMullen v. Carnegie Bros. &
Co., i58 Pa. 518 (1893); McGinley v. L. C. & N. Co., 224 Pa. 408 (igo9).
'H. & B. Car Co. v. Przezdzsankowski, 170 Ind. 5 (i9o8); following
dictum in Neutz v. Coal & Coke Co., I39 Ind. 411 (1894).
'Winterbottom v. Wright, io M. & W. 2o9 (1842).
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return for this benefit owes a duty to all those who work with,
or upon, the cars under this mutually beneficial arrangement, to use
ordinary care to see that the cars are reasonably safe for the contemplated uses.
The celebrated case of Heaven v. Pender, 10 declares a broader
rule, but the element of benefit to the person who supplied the dock
furnishings is remarked upon in the case. The suggested test of
liability has been consciously applied by the courts in but few cases
which deal with the liability of a railroad to the servant of a shipper
or consignee, who was injured by reason of a defect in the car delivered by the railroad; but an examination of the facts of each
case shows that the element of benefit to the railroad was always
considered in the case. In Elliott v. Hall," it was held that owners
of a colliery had such direct beneficial interest in the receipt and
unloading of the coal by the consignee that they were liable to his
servant who was injured by a defective car. In Roddy v. Mo. Pac.
R. R.1 the interest of the railroad in carrying large shipments from
a quarry was held to raise a duty to furnish safe cars. The same
idea, more or less prominently and clearly expressed, runs through
all the cases. A railroad supplying cars "with the intention that
people with whom it has business and their help shall work with,
about or in the cars"'13 must use ordinary care to avoid injury to the
persons so using the cars. "The contract between the defendant
company and the plaintiff's employer created the duty out of which
the duty of the defendant to the plaintiff arose." '1 "The revenue
of the railroad is dependent upon the patronage of those who have
merchandise to transport, and any arrangement between the shipper
and the railroad to their mutual benefit" gives rise to the duty above
mentioned. 15 Similar expressions are to be found in the opinions of
nearly every case 26 where the railroad has been held to owe the
duty of exercising reasonable care. 17 Other elements such as the
selection of the car 8 and the retention of partial control by the
railroad, 19 have in many cases been given prominent consideration,

'See article by Professor F. H. Bohlen, on Basis of Affirmative Obligation in the Law of Torts, 44 Amer. Law Reg. 2o9, et seq.
'L. R. ii Q. B. D. 503 (1883).
"L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 315 (1885).
"104 Mo. 234 (189i).

"Sykes v. R. R., 88 Mo. App. 193 (i9o4).

"Hummel v. R. R., 167 Fed. 89 (19o9).
"R. R. v. Booth, 98 Ga. 20 (1895).
"Olson v. P. & 0. Fuel Co., 77 Minn. 528 (1899); R. R. v. Pritchard,
x68 Ind. 398 (i9o7).
"As to the standard of care required see White v. R. R., 25 R. I. i9
(19o3); and Rehm v. R. R., 164 Pa. 91 (894), a case which should be limited strictly to its facts since the principles upon which the decision is based
are clearly fallacious.
"Hale v. R. R., igo Mass. 84 (i9o6).
"Ladd v. R. R., 193 Mass. 359 (907).
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but the element of mutuality of benefit under the traffic agreements
is always present.
The negative aspect of the rule placing an obligation upon the
railroad in return for the benefit accruing to it, may be seen in two
cases. In Sawyer v. R. R. 20 the car in question which was defectively
constructed originally, was being used by the plaintiff's employer
after it should have been returned to the defendant railroad. The
beneficial interest of the defendant in the use of the car had ceased
and the defendant was held not liable. In Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Mulholland,21 a coal car was delivered upon a siding. The consignees
engaged another railroad to move the car some distance further and
a servant of the latter was injured by a defective brake. It was
held that the first railroad had no interest in the contract between
the consignee and the plaintiff's employer and so owed no duty
to the plaintiff. On its facts, it seems as if the court might have
found a beneficial interest in the defendant but the principle is
clear.
Recovery has been denied in this class of cases upon another
ground, namely, that there is a duty of inspection and repair incumbent upon the plaintiff's employer whether he is a shipper 22 or
a receiving railroad, 23 and that the omission or negligent discharge
of this duty intervenes between the negligence of the defendant
and the injury to the plaintiff, and severs the causal connection
between the two. Other cases 24 support the principal case and declare that the causal connection is not broken if the intervening
negligence might have been anticipated as following, the original
act of negligence in the natural and ordinary sequence of affairs.
The latter view prevails in other classes of torts of negligence and
would seem to be correct. 25 The principal case is therefore amply
supported upon principle and by authority.2"
L.P.S.
38 Minn. w03 (1888).
z898 A. C. 216.

Risque v. R. R., supra; McCullion v. R. R., 88 Pac. Rep. 50 (Kas.
i9o6).
' Sellis v. R. R., 124 Mich. 37 (igoo); Glynn v. R. R., 175 Mass. 510
(igoo), in effect overruled by the principal case; R. R. v. Merrill, 65 Kas.
436 (i902), strong dissenting opinion.

"'Moon v. R. R., 46 Minn. io6 (i8gi; R. R. v. Snyder, 55 Ohio St. 342
(1896).
Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (5th e&) § 34.
"6A recent Pennsylvania case, Rick v. R. R., 232 Pa. 553 (Dec., I91x),
held that a railroad which issued to the shipper a bill of lading for a car
of bar iron was liable in damages for an injury to a servant of the consignee caused during the unloading on a private siding of the consignee by
a discoverable defect in the floor of the car. The basis of the duty of
inspection and repair declared to be owed to the plaintiff is not definitely
stated, but it seems to be the contract of shipment whereby the railroad
received the benefit of the payment of freight charges. See also McConnell
v. R. R., 223 Pa. 442 (I9og).

